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The Search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) 
 
From the late 1950s onwards, Western psychological, neuroscientific and 
philosophical theories of mind and consciousness largely adopted one or another form 
of physicalist or functionalist reductionism—the view that consciousness is nothing 
more than a state or function of the brain. Francis Crick (1994), for example, made the 
point that in science, reductionism is both common and successful.  Genes turned out to 
be nothing but DNA molecules, so in science, this is the best way to proceed.  While he 
recognised that the experienced (first-person) “qualia” of consciousness pose a problem 
for reductionism, he suggested that in the fullness of time it may be possible to describe 
the neural correlates of such qualia.  And, if we can understand the nature of the 
correlates we may come to understand the corresponding forms of consciousness.  By 
these means, he claimed, science will show that “You're nothing but a pack of neurones!” 
(Ibid. p.3) 
 
However, this view was overly simplistic. In science, correlates are not the same as 
causes, and neither correlation nor causation suffice to establish ontological identity. 
Given this, and the many other problems for reductionism posed by consciousness1, 
contemporary neuroscientists have largely adopt a more cautious approach, which 
accepts that it might be possible to isolate the exact causal antecedents and neural 
correlates of a given conscious experience, without reducing that experience to either its 
antecedent causes or its correlates. The papers in this section introduce major phases 
and findings in this search. 
 
The section begins with a review of seminal studies by the neurophysiologist Benjamin 
Libet (1982—R48). Subjectively, we seem to be immediately aware of what we attend 
to.  However, experiments on the timing of conscious awareness by Benjamin Libet 
suggest that consciousness of input does not arise until at least 200 msec. after stimuli 
arrive at the cortical surface. Libet, et al. (1979), for example, found that direct 
microelectrode stimulation of the somatosensory cortex required a pulse train of at least 
200 msec. duration before any conscious awareness of the stimulus was reported (pulse 
trains 10% shorter than this were not subjectively experienced).  They also found that 
tactile stimuli applied to a finger were masked (prevented from entering consciousness) 
by microelectrode stimulation of the somatosensory cortex applied up to 200 msec. after 
the arrival of the tactile stimuli.  On the grounds that one cannot prevent a stimulus from 
entering consciousness after it has done so, they concluded that at least 200 msec. of 
processing time are required to produce neural conditions adequate to support 																																																								1	See Velmans (2009—R23) and the far more detailed analysis in Velmans (2009, chapters 1 to 5).	
consciousness.  The reason we do not experience any mismatch between experienced 
and actual stimulus arrival time appears to be that the brain records the actual time of 
arrival of the stimulus at the cortical surface.  The brain then enters this into the 
representations of input time that it constructs—in spite of the fact that the 
representations themselves take about 200 msec. to construct—a form of “backward 
referral in time”.   	
Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990—R49) gave a useful summary of the discoveries 
in experimental psychology that have a bearing on the understanding of 
consciousness, but noted that the functional models provided by this form of 
investigation were not sufficiently precise to offer a unique description of the 
processes that support consciousness in the brain. They then proposed a series of 
questions that need to be answered to develop such an understanding along with a 
programme of research that might in principle begin to answer them. This paper and 
their subsequent collaborations had a major influence in fostering a new cognitive 
neuroscience of consciousness and with it the ‘respectability’ of Consciousness Studies 
within mainstream science.	
 
Human conscious experience is normally well integrated. But how is this achieved? 
Physical objects and events are initially subject to a detailed (preconscious) analysis of 
physical features, and these features are coded in topographically distinct regions of 
the brain. Given this, the brain must somehow combine these features into 
representations that correspond to (and correlate with) the integrated objects and 
events that we experience. The contents of consciousness also change continuously, but 
they are bound together in time, appearing as a seamless, coherent flow in space and 
time. Singer (2013—R50) reviews evidence that the brain achieves such “binding” by 
the temporary association of neurons activated by currently present features into 
widely distributed, functionally coherent assemblies, which as a whole represent a 
particular content. Following this flexible strategy, a particular neuron can, at different 
times, participate in different assemblies just as a particular feature can be part of 
many different perceptual objects. This also allows for the rapid de novo 
representation of constellations that have never been experienced before because 
there are virtually no limits to the dynamic association of neurons in ever changing 
constellations. A currently favoured theory of the binding process suggests that this 
might be achieved by mutual entrainment of neuronal oscillations resulting in the 
synchronous or correlated firing of diverse neuron groups representing currently 
attended to objects or events, and, as Singer points out, the evidence for the existence 
of such binding processes, involving rhythmic frequencies in the 30 to 80 Hz region is 
now quite extensive.  
 
Over the last 25 years or so, research on the neural markers of consciousness have 
become increasingly sophisticated, along with an understanding of the neural systems 
that normally support it in the human brain. Stanislas Dehaene and Jean-Pierre 
Changeux (2011—R51) survey a program of research that focuses on how an external 
or internal piece of preconscious information gains access to conscious processing, a 
transition characterized by the existence of a reportable subjective experience. They 
report that converging neuroimaging and neurophysiological data, acquired during 
minimal experimental contrasts between conscious and nonconscious processing, 
point to the following objective neural measures of conscious access: late 
amplification of relevant sensory activity, long-distance cortico-cortical 
synchronization at beta and gamma frequencies, and ‘‘ignition’’ of a large-scale 
prefronto-parietal network. They then go on to compare these findings to current 
theoretical models of conscious processing, including the Global Neuronal Workspace 
(GNW) model 2  according to which conscious access occurs when incoming 
information is made globally available to multiple brain systems through a network of 
neurons with long-range axons densely distributed in prefrontal, parieto-temporal, 
and cingulate cortices. The clinical implications of these results for general anesthesia, 
coma, vegetative state, and schizophrenia are also discussed. 
Global Disorders of Consciousness 
One of the obvious ways to determine the necessary and sufficient neural conditions 
for consciousness in the human brain is to isolate conditions that abolish it or globally 
impair it. Joseph Bogen (1995—R52) gives a detailed case in support of the 
Intralaminar Nuclei (ILN) of the thalamus having a critical role in the support of 
consciousness that draws on a wide range of resources, using evidence from anatomy, 
physiology, pathology, psychology and philosophy. For example, even small lesions in 
ILN can produce coma from which patients never recover. By contrast, cortical lesions, 
even as large as hemispherectomies, only abolish some contents of consciousness, not 
consciousness itself.  While this does not establish consciousness to be located in 
ILN, it does suggest that these serve as important gateways to it in the normally 
functioning human brain. 
 
Giacino, Fins, Laureys and Schiff (2014)3 provide a very thorough survey of global 
disorders of consciousness after acquired brain injury, such as coma, the vegetative 
state, minimally conscious states such as akinetic mutism, acute confusional states, 
and locked-in syndrome. They review the consciousness-altering pathophysiological 
mechanisms involved, the clinical syndromes they present, and discuss novel 
diagnostic and prognostic applications of advanced neuroimaging and 
electrophysiological procedures. Broadly speaking, disorders of consciousness can 
arise from both focal injuries that induce widespread functional changes and from 
more global injuries, from both direct perturbations of neural systems that regulate 
arousal and awareness and indirectly from disruptions in the connections between 
these systems—and they go on to specify the details of such injuries and consequent 
changes. They conclude with a provocative discussion of bioethical and medico-legal 
issues that are unique to this population and have a profound impact on care, as well 
as raising questions of broad societal interest.  
																																																								2	The Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model is a development of the Global Workspace (GW) 
model originally advocated by Baars (1988)—see R38. Dehaene (2014) also provides an excellent, 
detailed account of this program of research.	3	Unfortunately, the reprint cost of this paper was too expensive to include in this collection, but it is 
available online at http://www.nature.com/nrneurol/journal/v10/n2/full/nrneurol.2013.279.html 
Some challenges for NCC research 
Most contemporary theories of consciousness in humans give prominence to the role 
of the thalamo-cortical complex. However, in his Behavioral and Brain Sciences target 
article “Consciousness without a cerebral cortex” Bjorn Merker (2007—R53) 
challenges the necessity of a cerebral cortex. Drawing on evidence about the 
functional organization of vertebrate brains ranging from comparative neurology to 
experimental psychology and from neurophysiology to clinical data in humans he 
presents a detailed case for the central role of the upper brain stem system in the 
support of consciousness and the control of behavior, a view pioneered by Wilder 
Penfield (reviewed in Penfield, 1975).  This system, which extends from the roof of the 
midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed 
information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential 
mode of operation required for coherent behaviour. It maintains special connective 
relations with cortical regions that are involved in attentional and conscious functions, 
but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. As he notes, this 
helps to explain the purposive, goal-directed behaviour exhibited by mammals after 
experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a 
cortex are conscious. On the basis of such evidence, he concludes that this upper brain 
stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an 
expanding forebrain—culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals—came to serve 
as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents but not for its existence.  
 
Such caveats highlight the importance of positioning human consciousness within a 
broader evolutionary context, with consequences for our understanding of 
consciousness in non-human animals (see also R47, R48).  More fundamentally, it also 
points to the importance of distinguishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the existence of consciousness (of any kind) from the added conditions required to 
support the many forms it can take—which are easily confounded in the search for 
NCC (c.f. Velmans, 2012).  
In another challenging paper, Aru et al. (2012—R54) give a thoughtful review of the 
problems of separating the precise neural correlates of a given conscious content from 
its neural prerequisites (NCC-pr)	 and neural consequences (NCC-co), which can be 
confounded if one simply compares perceptual conditions in which a given content is 
present with similar conditions in which it is absent (the commonly used method of 
“contrastive analysis”). They review evidence of such confounds in the literature and 
propose experimental strategies to untangle them. They suggest, for example, that 
the most straightforward way to disentangle NCC-pr from NCC is to directly 
manipulate the NCC-pr processes, and compare the neural signatures that are 
common to all of them. Given that the NCC-co are after-effects of conscious 
perception, it is logically possible to observe NCC even when NCC-co are not elicited. 
Such dissociations might not occur very often in the normally functioning brain, 
however lesion studies might reveal them, or in some situations one might be able to 
repress NCC-co experimentally with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)—and 
they go on to give examples of the data that such studies provide. 
A similarly cautious message is conveyed by the extensive, recent review of progress 
and problems of NCC research by Koch, Massimini, Boly, and Tononi (2016).4 Koch et 
al. distinguish between content-specific NCC, full NCC, and background supporting 
conditions for consciousness. Content-specific NCC are the neural mechanisms whose 
activity determines a particular phenomenal distinction within an experience. The full 
NCC are the neural substrates supporting conscious experiences in their entirety, irre-
spective of their specific contents. The brainstem reticular formation, paramedian 
thalamus and perhaps parts of the postero-medial cortex are likely to provide the 
background conditions for full consciousness. They also note that at least part of the 
neural activity that co-varies with the perception of a particular conscious content 
reflects processes that precede or follow the experience, such as selective attention, 
expectation, self-monitoring, unconscious stimulus processing, task planning and 
reporting, rather than the experience itself (see R54). Once these functional 
conditions are controlled for the reliability of most neural markers currently thought 
to be indices of consciousness weakens. For example, many studies of NCC did not 
carefully dissociate conscious visibility from selective attention (see also R35). When 
this is done, the high-range gamma synchronization (often thought of as a marker of 
consciousness) correlates with attention, independent of whether the participant saw 
the stimulus, whereas mid-range gamma synchronization correlates with the visibility 
of the stimulus. Even worse, gamma synchrony can persist or even increase during 
early Non-REM sleep, during anaesthesia, or during seizures. They also survey 
evidence, that overall, there is only a weak correlation between consciousness and 
thalamic activity, making this an unreliable marker of consciousness. In the light of 
this, they go on make various suggestions about how NCC research should proceed, 
argue for a few alternative candidate NCC (a posterior cortical activity “hot-spot”, and 
various measures of “cortical integration”), and conclude that the low-voltage fast 
activity observed with EEG recordings performed during attentive wakefulness, also 
known as activated or desynchronized EEG—which was one of the first candidate 
electrophysiological indices of consciousness—is still one of the most sensitive and 
useful markers available.      
The Divided Brain 
 
The left and right hemispheres of the brain are connected by the cerebal commissures, 
and research with cerebral commissurotomy patients (where the commissures have 
been sectioned) proved to be very useful in determining the respective functions of 
the two halves of the brain.  It also raised some fundamental theoretical/philosophical 
questions: Could consciousness itself be divided by this operation? And, if so, would 
such patients have a distinct left-brain and right-brain consciousness? “Split brain” 
patients were all advanced epileptics in whom an extensive midline section of the 
cerebral commissures had been carried out in an effort to contain severe epileptic 
convulsions not controlled by medication. Studies of such patients, pioneered by 
Roger Sperry and his colleagues	Philip Vogel, Joseph Bogen and Michael Gazzaniga 
exploited the fact that the left half of the visual field projects onto the right 																																																								4	This major review has many, important implications for NCC research. Unfortunately, the reprint 
cost of this paper was too expensive to include in this collection, but it is available online at 
http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v17/n5/abs/nrn.2016.22.html	
hemisphere while the right half of the visual field projects onto the left hemisphere; 
the left hemisphere also controls the right hand, while the right hemisphere controls 
the left hand. This allows information to be projected to only one hemisphere, and a 
way of measuring its response—a way to assess the functioning and associated 
experience of each hemisphere. Sperry (1968—R55), and Sperry, Gazzaniga & Bogen 
(1969—R56) provides good, initial reviews of this research along with descriptions of 
which functions are divided and which are spared by this operation.  
 
The most remarkable effect of sectioning the neocortical commissures in this way is 
the apparent lack of effect on normal behaviour. Nevertheless, in these carefully 
controlled studies, patients behaved in many ways as if they had two independent 
streams of conscious awareness, one in each hemisphere, each of which was cut off 
from the experiences of the other. Each hemisphere seemed to have its own separate, 
private sensations, perceptions, concepts, and its own impulses to act, with related 
volitional, cognitive, learning experiences, and memories that were inaccessible to the 
recall processes of the other. The two hemispheres also turn out to be specialised to 
function in somewhat different (but overlapping) ways. For example in right handed 
patients, the left hemisphere typically controls speech and has superior linguistic 
functioning, while the right hemisphere has superior control of visual-spatial 
operations. The studies explored these and many other fine grained differences in 
how the two halves of the brain differ and how they interact, which subsequently fed 
in to an extensive, on-going research program into left brain versus right brain 
differences. 
 
The recent review chapter by Colvin, et al (2017—R57) brings developments in this 
research up-to-date, with an added focus on why it might that, in spite of evidence for 
a distinct left and right brain consciousness, comissurotomy patients do not appear to 
exhibit split consciousness in their normal behaviour. Following Gazzaniga’s 
interpretation of the evidence, they argue that the left hemisphere, which normally 
controls speech and the ability to report, simply responds on the basis of all the 
information available to it—and, lacking access to right hemisphere experience, has 
no sense that it’s consciousness is split. 
The Reintroduction of First-Person Methods 
As Boring (1953—R14) observed, introspective methods never really left psychology, 
even during its behaviourist period. However with the re-emergence of Consciousness 
Studies in the 1990s and the development of more sophisticated neuroimaging 
methods (PET, fMRI etc.), there was a renewed interest in developing more refined 
first-person (introspective) methods for the investigation of conscious experience that 
could, in principle, complement the finer detail in which neuroscientific methods were 
beginning to reveal the dynamics of the brain. This renewed interest was marked for 
example by the launch of a new interdisciplinary journal, Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences In 2002, and new collections of readings and major reviews of first-
person methods including Varela & Shear (1999), Velmans (2000b), Petitmengin 
(2009), Hurlburt (2011), and Price and Barrell (2012—R61, 62, 63).  
Neurophenomenology 
In a review of the state-of-play in the mid 1990s, along with suggestions on how to 
move things forward, Francisco Varela (1996—R58) drew a useful map of where 16 
authors with extensive writings on how to understand consciousness positioned 
themselves on two dimensions: (a) stress on first-person accounts of phenomenology 
being essential, versus neo-reductionism or eliminativism (first-person accounts 
having no place in science at all); and (b) in terms of their commitment to the empirical 
solubility of the “hard problem” of consciousness, ranging from functionalist 
reductionists who believe all problems will be solved by discovery of the processes 
(cognitively or physiologically specified) with which consciousness is most closely 
associated, versus mysterians who argue that a full understanding of consciousness is 
beyond human mental capacities. Varela positioned himself as (a) defending the 
importance of phenomenology and (b) not committed to either functionalist 
reductionism or mysterianism. Instead, he advocated neurophenomenology, a 
suggested methodological route through the “hard problem” in which refined forms 
of phenomenological investigation (developed within the tradition of European 
phenomenology) could be related to the more detailed accounts of neurodynamic 
activities accompanying such phenomenology that were becoming available from 
investigations of the brain (see also R61). At the Centre National de Recherche 
Scientifique in Paris, he also initiated a research program to develop such first-person 
methods and research, and specified some of the characteristics of that program in 
this paper. 
 Antoine Lutz and Evan Thompson (2003—R59) provide a nice illustration of how this 
program can be carried out in practice, in a way that synergises, (1) first-person data 
from the careful examination of experience with specific first-person methods, (2) 
formal models and analytical tools from dynamical systems theory, grounded on an 
embodied-enactive approach to cognition, and (3) neurophysiological data from 
measurements of large-scale, integrative processes in the brain. They also elaborate 
on different forms of consciousness (viewed from a phenomenological perspective), 
the skills required to develop an attentive awareness of one’s own experience (similar 
to mindfulness-awareness in the Buddhist tradition), and (second-person) methods 
whereby descriptions of such experiences can be shared in experimental 
investigations. In their selection of salient neural indices of cognitive-phenomenal 
(conscious) states, they advocate the relevance of collective variables that describe 
the emergence and change of patterns of large-scale neural integration—but stress 
that such states must be understood as enactive, embodied, and embedded in the 
environment. They then describe a neurophenomenological pilot study that 
incorporates these principles.       
  
The most extensive research program in this tradition has been carried out by Claire 
Petitmengin and her colleagues. Bitbol and Petitmengin (2017—R60) review this 
program and its broader implications. They point out that, for Varela, the 
phenomenological roots of neurophenomenology provide more than an experimental 
method. Given its stress on the epistemic primacy of lived, embodied experience, it 
can be seen as a way of bypassing conventional first-person (‘subjective’) versus third-
person (‘objective’) ways of construing the mind/body problem. Instead, mind and 
body are viewed as two ways of ordering and selecting aspects of a single flux of lived 
experience, which lead, they argue, to a form of deep neurophenomenology, a 
potentially transformative process, in which conventional mind/body problems simply 
do not arise.5 They document the detailed techniques of the micro-phenomenological 
interview (previously called the “elicitation interview”), which enable fine-grained 
recollection and description of specific aspects of one’s own lived experience, allowing 
identification of its generic structures and its micro-dynamic changes, which usually 
remain unnoticed and unrecognized. The method also includes a set of objective 
verbal and non-verbal criteria for checking its own effectiveness. They give examples 
of the diverse situations in which the procedure has allowed the detection of 
previously unnoticed, but consistent micro-dynamics in diverse experiences, ranging 
from studies of creative thinking where the method revealed the progressive 
transformation of a fuzzy and blurred feeling into a “clear and distinct idea”, to clinical 
applications, where epileptic patients learnt to become aware of early signs 
announcing the arrival of an epileptic seizure—providing a key to new cognitive 
therapies. They go on to give a critique of the various ways that the potential of 
introspective methods have been misunderstood, and give a detailed analysis of how 
the fine-grained nature of the micro-phenomenological interview may be an 
appropriate accompaniment to the increasingly fine-grained study of the 
neurophysiological dynamics of the brain. 
 
The use of complementary first- and third-person perspectives 
The view that consciousness and its neural accompaniments are best thought of as 
two manifestations of one underlying, psychophysical process that can be known in 
two complementary, first- and third-person ways has roots in the philosophical 
writings of Theodore Fechner (see R4) and older roots in the dual-aspect monism of 
Spinoza (1677). In the modern literature, it finds its most complete, experimental 
expression in the work of Donald Price and James Barrell (2012), which introduces and 
reviews a form of experiential neuroscience, a program of research that reintegrates 
studies of experience with psychology and neuroscience in which they have engaged 
for over 40 years.  
In their chapter on “Developing a science of human meaning and consciousness”, Price 
and Barrell (R61) introduce the philosophical and methodological origins of their 
approach, pointing out that both first- and third-person data have their source in how 
we experience the phenomena of the world as well as our innermost thoughts, 
feelings and meanings—a self-evident truth that is largely ignored by Western 
materialist philosophy and science. They briefly review other research programs with 
similar aims (e.g. introspection, phenomenology, and Hurlburt’s Descriptive 
Experience Sampling technique) and introduce two important, added ingredients 																																																								5	The epistemic primacy of experience in knowledge and consequently its role in the creation of (and 
potential resolution of) the subjective versus objective distinction was also advocated by the neutral 
monists (see James, 1902—R5), as well as later readings in this section, although these alternative 
approaches offer different ontologies.  	
required for a fully integrated first- and third-person approach: quantitative 
psychophysics, and the experiential exploration of not just the sensed qualities of 
experience, but also their personal meanings which are essential not just to an 
understanding of the experiences themselves, but also to consequent behavior and 
even psychophysiological response. They go on to give details of their experiential 
paradigm, which applies structured methods for (1) attending to the content of 
specific experiences, (2) reporting that content, (3) understanding that content 
through the discovery of common factors, and (4) applying quantitative methods, 
drawn largely from psychometrics and psychophysics, to test the generality and 
functional relationships between common factors. 6  They go on to discuss the 
relevance of such studies to a more complete understanding of the associated 
neuroscience, pointing out the limitations of reductionist approaches, and elaborating 
on ways in which neuroscience and experiential science can enhance each other, for 
example within a reflexive model of these relationships (Velmans, 2009) which 
accepts that neither first- nor third-person accounts are observer-free or incorrigible, 
that a complete account of the operations of mind require both—and they go on to 
describe the potential of such an approach for a broader understanding of the human 
condition. 	
In their chapter on ‘Human pain and suffering’ (R62) Price and Barrell give a very 
detailed demonstration of how their program works in practice.	As they note, pain is 
an experience that has both sensory and affective dimensions. Not merely unpleasant, 
it can be the kind of unpleasantness that makes people scream, fight, undergo 
crippling, disfiguring operations, or commit suicide. These intense, complex 
dimensions need to be made explicit, which a well-formed experiential analysis can 
provide. Once explicit, such dimensions can provide a sound basis for investigations 
of pain-related neural pathways, neurotransmitters, and integrative centers of the 
brain. For example, studies by Price and his colleagues in the 1980s and 1990s of many 
different forms of pain including musculoskeletal pain, neuropathic pain, cancer pain, 
and labour pain isolated three common factors: (1) unique sensory qualities (to a given 
form of pain) that are like those which occur during tissue damaging stimulation, (2) a 
closely related meaning of intrusion and/or threat, and (3) a related feeling of 
unpleasantness and/or other possible negative emotion(s). Not surprisingly, factors 
(2) and (3) can vary independently of (1). Hot spicy foods for example are experienced 
as intrusive or damaging by some individuals but as pleasant by others. The meaning 
attributed to a given pain (2) also influences how unpleasant it is (3). Price, Harkings 
and Baker (1987) for example found that in a study of labour pain, the unpleasantness 
of pain was heavily influenced by whether women were focused mainly on avoiding 
the pain or focused on having the baby, with the latter rating pain unpleasantness at 
approximately one-half of those focused on the pain or on avoiding it and that this 
																																																								6	For example,	once	factors central to a given experience are found they can be scaled into 
measurable dimensions and then manipulated as dependent or independent variables in 
conventional experimental designs to explore their functional relationships. Causal relationships can 
also be explored using experimental designs that use structural equation modeling to isolate which 
factors are necessary and sufficient for the existence of other factors, along with other techniques 
that can track causal dependencies within a given experiment.	
was true at every stage of labour. In short cognitive-evaluative factors also influence 
pain unpleasantness, a finding that has clear therapeutic implications. 
Once elaborated in this way, it is also easier to distinguish the pain sensation as such 
from consequent suffering. The immediateness and unpleasantness of pain is also 
often accompanied by a desire to reduce or terminate it, and a level of expectation 
that it can be reduced, and these dimensions of experience turn out to be causal 
factors in pain-related emotional feelings such as depression, anxiety, frustration and 
fear, along with emotions associated with the interruption of one’s life activities, the 
difficulty of enduring the pain over long periods, and concern for future 
consequences. The functional relationships among these complex factors can be 
clarified a) by studies that examine the successive psychological stages of pain 
processing, e.g. using a form of path analysis (structural equation modeling), and b) 
studies that demonstrate the selective effects of personality traits and demographic 
factors on suffering (as opposed to the immediate pain experience). To complete the 
circle of understanding Price and Barrell then give a very detailed analysis of how these 
psychological functional dependencies can be related to a complex, testable, neural 
model of pain-related processing (based on Price’s own extensive neuropsychological 
research). 
In their chapter on  ‘Second pain: a model for explaining a conscious experience?’ 
(R63) Price and Barrell point out that second pain has unique features not predictable 
by either the nature of physical stimuli or the responses of peripheral pain receptors 
(connected to C axons). A single intense stimulus often gives rise to impulse input from 
fast conducting A-delta axons followed by impulses from slow conducting C axons, 
which respectively elicit first and second pain. Unlike sharp or pricking first pain, 
second pain has burning, aching or “dull” qualities, exhibits slow temporal summation, 
becoming stronger with repeated stimuli, often outlasts a stimulus that evokes it, and 
spreads into body regions outside the area of the stimulus as the pain becomes more 
intense. These characteristics are not easily explained by the nature of the physical 
stimulus alone, and require studies of neurons, pathways and interactions within the 
central nervous system. Price and Barrell then provide a very detailed account of the 
neural mechanisms involved—and provide evidence that neural activity in widely 
distributed areas within the spinal cord and brain are the causes and correlates of 
these different pain characteristics, with distinct activity patterns that closely 
correspond to each of the characteristics identified by first-person methods. They 
conclude with a discussion of the wider philosophical and methodological implications 
of this research—and overall provide what is perhaps the best example of how to 
combine an “outer psychophysics” with an “inner psychophysics” in the manner 
envisaged by Fechner (R8) and advocated by Wundt (R9). 
 
The last reading in this section on ‘What consciousness does’ (Velmans, 2009, ch. 13—
R64) demonstrates how complementary first- and third person perspectives 
associated with dual-aspect monism can provide a plausible account of how to make 
sense of one of the hardest, most enduring problems of consciousness—the causal 
interactions of consciousness and brain.7 As he notes, conventional medicine takes the 
physical causation of physical effects for granted, psychiatry takes the physical causation 
of mental effects for granted, many forms of psychotherapy take the causal effects of 
mental states on other mental states for granted, and psychosomatic medicine, 
psychoneuroimmunology etc., assume that mental states can have causal effects on 
physical states. Given the extensive evidence for all these forms of causation, how are 
we to make sense of them? The chapter reviews the main problems with dualist and 
materialist reductionist accounts, and develops the case for a non-reductive, dual-aspect 
monist alternative, in which first-person (experiential) and third-person 
(neurophysiological) observable features of the operations of mind (and consequent 
first- versus third-person accounts) are complementary views of one, underlying, 
psychophysical form of human information processing (roughly analogous to the way 
that electricity and magnetism may be thought of as complementary features of 
electromagnetism). This provides a simple way of making sense of all four forms of 
physical/mental causation.  Operations of mind viewed from a purely third-person 
perspective appear as forms of physical→physical causation, operations of mind viewed 
from a purely first-person perspective appear as forms of mental→mental causation, and 
cases of mind/body interaction (physical→mental and mental→physical) can be seen as 
mixed-perspective accounts involving perspectival switching. All of these can be 
understood as different views (or a mix of views) of a single, psychophysical form of 
information processing developing over time.  In providing a common psychophysical 
ground for brain operations and associated experiences, such a process also provides the 
“missing link” required to explain psychosomatic effects. The chapter then goes on to 
demonstrate how this approach can resolve the “causal paradox”—that, viewed from a 
purely third-person perspective, consciousness appears causally ineffective 
(epiphenomenal) while viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness and its 
operations appear to be crucially important to much of human life. 8 
 
Free Will 
Whether humans have free will or whether their actions are entirely determined by 
the laws of physics, physiology, and the accidents of heredity and environment has 
long been debated within philosophy and science. In modern consciousness studies 
however the debate was energized by the findings of Benjamin Libet on how feelings 
of wishing or deciding to act relate to prior processing in the brain. Much of this work 
was summarised in Libet (1985—R65) a target article in the Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences. Libet demonstrated that a slow negative shift in electrical potential (known 
as the “readiness potential”), which was known to signal preparation for action, 
preceded the experienced wish to act by around 350 milliseconds, suggesting that the 
brain was preparing to act, before the conscious experience even arises! Given the 
theoretical implications of this as well as ethical and legal implications, this finding was 
subject to extensive critique, debate and consequent research.  																																																								7	Originally developed in Velmans (2000a) this analysis also formed the basis of Velmans (2002a) a 
target article for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, followed by 12 commentaries 
and two responses (Velmans, 2002b, 2003).	8	Although arrived at independently, the analysis is intriguingly similar to the dual-aspect monism 
developed by Romanes (1885—R21) to counter Huxley’s epiphenomenalism (R20).	
 
Chris Frith (2013—R66) provides an insightful review of this research, arguing that 
many of the problems of free will arise from mixing up two perspectives from which 
volition can be viewed (see also R21, R61, R64). From the third-person view, volitional 
behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate 
environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. From the 
first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of 
agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we 
can choose between different actions. However, our experience of agency is not 
direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and 
sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions 
about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless (viewed from a first 
person perspective) our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. For 
example, anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can 
alter behaviour—and the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a 
critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. In arguing for these views, 
Frith examines the relationship between free choice, determinism, flexibility, and 
unpredictability, the nature of endogenous self-generated behaviour, and the extent 
to which one can predict endogenously generated behaviour on the basis of prior 
brain activity. He then turns to research on how volition is experienced, which 
suggests that, when all is going well, we are simply aware of our intention to act and 
of the effect of our action on the world (the outcome) as a check that our intention 
has been fulfilled. The contingent relation between the experienced intention and the 
outcome has also been shown to contribute in various ways to our experience of 
agency. Frith suggests that it is our experience of agency that gives us our sense of 
responsibility, which, in turn, can be responsible for feelings of regret, along with 
cultural phenomena such as praise and punishment. He concludes by discussing the 
wider effects of culture on the experience of agency and the linked differences 
between human experiences of agency and that of other animals. 9 
 
Although much of the free-will research was energized by Libet’s experiments on the 
lag between neural preparation to act and the experienced wish to act, in the last five 
years or so, the understanding of Libet’s research has changed.  Schurger (2017—R67) 
brings this topic (including a review of neurological disorders of volition) up to date.  
In particular, he reviews evidence that the complex brain activities preceding and 
contributing to an experienced decision to act (signaled by the readiness potential and 
other markers) continue to develop over time, and that the final neural decision to act 
in a chosen way may be much closer to the experience to do so than previously 
believed. That said, he also notes that, in recent years, debates about whether will is 
“free” no longer depend on whether will is “conscious”, both in psychology and 
philosophy of mind (see also R64 where the implications of this for an understanding 
of conscious causation are discussed). He concludes that the processes that produce 
a conscious feeling of wanting to move a body part are independent from the 																																																								9	Haggard (2008) also provides an excellent review along with a discussion of how voluntary action 
relates to consciousness, and some interesting comments about what this implies for social and legal 
responsibility. Unfortunately, the reprint cost of this paper was too expensive to include in this 
collection, but it is available online at http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v9/n12/full/nrn2497.html	
mechanisms involved in actually bringing that movement about. However, these 
different processes might be very tightly coupled, and the feeling of intending might 
emerge at the same time that the movement is being triggered, at least under normal 
everyday circumstances. Overall, this leads to a form of compatibilism, in which first-
person feelings (and accounts of those feelings) are complementary to third-person 
observations (and accounts of those observations) of associated brain activities. This, 
in turn, opens up the possibility that feelings of having freedom to act (within existing 
constraints) are compatible with the operations of the underlying processes that 
govern those choices—a route through the free-will versus determinism debate 
within philosophy of mind (Velmans, 2003). 
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